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The Probability of Sale and Price Premiums in Withdrawn 
Auctioned Properties 
 
1: Introduction 
The last three decades have seen a large number of papers to have considered the 
theoretical constructs of auctions. This literature has considered a wide range of issues 
such as alternative auction methods; the preference of auction versus negotiated sales 
in terms of expected revenue; risk aversion from the perspective of both sellers and 
bidders; the probability of sale; the impact of the number of bidders; the nature of the 
information in particular the issue of common and private information and the 
importance of reserve prices. However, relatively few papers have empirically 
considered the impact of the auction process on the subsequent sale of assets that did 
not meet the reserve price, i.e. properties that were withdrawn at auction and sold 
subsequent to the event.  In a residential property context, two key exceptions are 
Ashenfelter & Genesove (1992) and Ong (2006).  Ashenfelter & Genesove (1992) 
found evidence that successful auction sales achieved an average premium of 13% 
over those properties initially offered at auction, withdrawn, and then subsequently 
sold.  Ong (2006) extends this analysis to find that issues such as the attendance at the 
auction and whether no bids were submitted at auction have a positive and negative 
impact respectively on the probability of sale.  
 
However, these papers, as with many in the broad auction literature have been 
constrained by the availability of data, indeed it remains one of the most common 
challenges in the field. This paper considers the residential auction market in Dublin, 
Ireland and specifically examines the dynamics of properties unsuccessfully offered 
for sale through auction. The dataset utilised in the paper includes information often 
missing from empirical auction research, including; the undisclosed reserve, 
attendance at the auction and the number of bids and bidders. A key advantage 
through the use of this data is that we do not have to rely on proxies to capture the 
impact of different factors. A further consideration in the examination of the Irish 
market is that auctions were an extremely popular form of sale mechanism during the 
boom period. The sample period covered in this paper is 1998 through 2002 and so 
allows an examination of a distinct period when auctions were frequently utilised, 
especially at the premium end of the market. The remainder of the paper is set out as 
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follows.  The next section briefly outlines the process for auction sales in the Republic 
of Ireland. Section 3 considers the existing empirical work examining housing 
auctions while Section 4 provides information on the dataset and the methodological 
framework adopted. Section 5 presents the empirical results and concluding 
comments are made in the final section. 
 
 
2: Auction Process in Ireland 
Residential properties in Ireland that were sold through auction are done so using the 
first-price English open-outcry method. In determining the sale mechanism utilised, 
this decision was made by the vendor in association with the estate agent prior to the 
marketing of the property. This decision process is made easier in the Irish context 
because the agents involved with both sale forms are the same firms.  The result is 
that if an auction sale method is decided upon, the agency concerned acts as the 
auctioneer for the sale. As Stevenson et al. (2010) illustrated, auctions tended to be 
used at the premium end of the market in Ireland, in common with markets like 
Australia (Lusht, 1996) and New Zealand (Doutzour et al., 1998). This finding is in 
contrast to markets such as the United States (DeBoer et al., 1992; Mayer, 1998 and 
McAfee at al. 2002) and Singapore (Ong et al., 2005, Ong 2006) where a large 
proportion of auctioned properties are distressed sales. This obviously leads to 
differences in terms of the motivation of the sellers concerned and is of particular 
importance in terms of the reserve estimates. As this sample consists of willing 
sellers, the reserve prices act as an estimate of market value for the property
1
. This is 
in sharp contrast to previous studies where the reserve price is often a measure of 
outstanding mortgage debt or unpaid taxes (DeBoer et al., 1992; McAfee et al., 
2002)
2
. 
 
Auction sales in Ireland generally follow a standard process. A three to four week 
marketing period will take place prior to the auction. This period is important to the 
auction as it will allow them to gauge potential demand for the property prior to the 
auction. As part of the marketing material a guide price will generally be provided. It 
is important to note that the guide price is neither a binding commitment on the part of 
the vendor or agent, nor is it the reserve price. The advertised guide price is rather a 
publicly available estimate of the property’s value and is effectively a component of 
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the marketing process. Stevenson et al. (2010) argue that guide prices for auction 
sales in Ireland are underpriced, hypothesizing that this may be due to auctioneers 
attempting to encourage bidders and participation in the auction. Their analysis, using 
a sample from the Dublin market, finds that whereas properties sold through auction 
did so at a significant premium to private treaty sales, the advertised guide prices for 
auctioned properties was significantly lower than for private treaty sales.  
 
The reserve price for an auctioned property will be agreed on the day of the auction 
by the vendor in association with the auctioneer.  The marketing period will have 
helped the agent in gauging potential demand and aided in the advice they provide to 
vendors with respect to an appropriate reserve.  The reserve set before the auction is 
the minimum acceptable price which the vendor will consider.  The reserve is not 
made public either prior to the auction or necessarily during the auction itself. This is 
in contrast with property auctions in other countries, such as Australia, where the 
reserve is made public (Lusht, 1994, 1996).  The only point during the auction process 
when the reserve may be revealed is during the auction where it is common for the 
auctioneer to declare that the property is ‘on-the-market’. Whilst it is not a legal 
requirement, in the majority of cases in our sample the auctioneer did so at some point 
after bidding had exceeded the reserve price. As is the case in most English open-
outcry auctions, as the reserve is the minimum acceptable price which the vendor will 
consider, if it is not achieved the vendor has the option of withdrawing the property 
from the market. It is these properties that this paper pays particular attention to. The 
custom in Ireland is that the right of first negotiation lies with the highest unsuccessful 
bidder. As will be noted shortly, the majority of properties withdrawn do sell very 
quickly after the auction.  
 
A major distinction between private treaty and auction sales in Ireland is the role of 
the initial deposit and the closing process.  Whilst transaction costs, commissions and 
other agency fees are identical in the case of private treaty and auction sales in 
Ireland, for private treaty sales the initial deposit is refundable up until the point that 
initial contracts are signed, a period generally 4 to 6 weeks following the initial 
agreement on price.  In the case of auctions, sales contracts are signed on the day of 
the auction and the successful bidder will be required to sign initial contracts and 
place a 10% non-refundable deposit before the close of business on the auction day.  
 6 
Furthermore, the successful bidder at auction is required to close the property sale 
within 6 weeks of the date of the auction. This not only means that there is an 
immediate financial cost for successful bidders, but also it is imperative that serious 
bidders have financing arrangements and any property inspections completed prior to 
the auction due to the non-refundable nature of the 10% deposit
3
.  
 
 
3: Auction Literature and Housing Assets 
Whilst there is a relatively large number of papers to have considered auctions in a 
real estate context the majority have concentrated their focus upon the broad issue of 
whether auctions or private treaty negotiations are the preferred sales mechanism. In 
part due to the difficulty in obtaining sufficiently in-depth data, empirical work on 
other issues has been relatively limited. With respect to those papers that have 
considered the broad sale mechanism issue, the evidence presented has been very 
mixed, particularly when considering results across different markets. The contrast in 
results obtained is of interest in the context of the broad auction literature. For 
example, papers such as Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1989) argue that for goods that 
are of high quality, are not standardized and where the market clearing price is 
unstable, then auctions will be preferred over negotiated sales. Furthermore, when 
goods are heterogeneous then prices will also display greater uncertainty (Milgrom, 
1989 and Bulow & Klemperer, 1996). In the case of English auctions with no reserve 
prices, Bulow & Klemperer (1996) show that a simple competitive auction with one 
additional bidder will result in higher revenue in comparison to an optimally 
structured negotiated sale that has one less bidder. They thus argue that the benefit of 
having additional bidders is greater than the value of negotiating skill. Even in the 
case where the cost of auctioning an asset may be high, auctions may be the preferred 
route. Wang (1993) argues that if the marginal revenue curve associated with the 
valuation the bidder attaches to the asset is sufficiently steep then auctions will be the 
optimal sale mechanism
4
. 
 
Despite this evidence, a large proportion of the empirical literature to have examined 
housing markets has provided evidence that properties sold through auction sell at a 
discount in comparison to private treaty sales. This is certainly true from the majority 
of studies to have considered the United Sates (e.g. Mayer, 1995, 1998; Allen & 
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Swisher, 2000). Mayer (1995) argues that as vendors selling privately are not time 
constrained they can wait longer in order to find a buyer more matched in terms of 
price. This is a similar argument to that presented in Adams et al. (1992) albeit in the 
context of slow Dutch auctions, and one that Mayer (1995) refers to as the Cost of 
Liquidity. In the context of auctions, there is a greater risk of mismatch, hence auction 
participants do not bid up the price. Furthermore, Mayer (1995) argues that properties 
that display less heterogeneity have a lower Cost of Mismatch and should therefore 
sell for a lower discount. Likewise, for more heterogeneous properties, they will be 
higher mismatch costs. Ong et al (2005) in their empirical examination of auctions in 
Singapore provide results that support the theoretical constructs of Mayer (1995). 
They find that apartments and condominiums, which can be viewed as being more 
homogeneous in nature than detached or semi-detached houses, have a higher 
probability of sale.  
 
Outside of the United States, however, there is evidence to suggest that an auction 
premium should exist in the context of property auctions.  Studies such as Newell et 
al. (1993) and Lusht (1996) for Australia, Dotzour et al. (1998) in the case of New 
Zealand, and Stevenson et al. (2010) for Ireland have all found evidence indicating 
the presence of an auction premium.  Stevenson et al. (2010) is of particular relevance 
given that it considers sales for the same market as the current paper, Dublin, and over 
a similar time-period, 1997 to 2004.  Based on a sample of 2,657 sales, a significantly 
positive coefficient (0.3157) is reported with respect to auction sales.  Whilst it would 
initially appear that these results contradict Mayer (1995) this is not necessarily so. 
Mayer (1995) acknowledges that his model assumes that a seller cannot adjust the 
price in the face of two bidders willing to pay the guide price. Therefore, in booming 
market where this may more commonly occur, auctions may provide an opportunity 
to maximize revenue as bidders can raise prices in excess of the guide price.  
Additionally, the auction discount would be reduced in circumstances where a greater 
number of bidders attended. This combination of market conditions and increased 
participation is a key element in reducing the cost of mismatch in property auctions.   
 
Mayer (1998) provides empirical evidence on role of market conditions relating to 
property auctions, with discounts ranging from 9% to 21% in the Dallas housing 
market crash of the late 1980’s to lower discounts (0% to 9%) found in the booming 
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Los Angeles market of the mid-1980s.  It is important to note that whilst discounts 
were still observed in these cases, they were of a lower magnitude during boom 
conditions.  In contrast, most of the studies that have reported auction premiums are 
from market samples dominated by rising or stable property markets. Certainly in an 
Irish context, the use of auctions has largely ceased in recent years following the 
collapse of the housing market in 2007.  Mayer (1998) further argues that issues such 
as the media attention that surrounds the use of auctions may also influence these 
findings and encourage a short-term non-sustainable auction premium. Again, there is 
some supporting evidence for this position with regard to those studies providing 
evidence of an auction premium.  Stevenson et al. (2010) report that in their tests for 
selectivity bias the time dummies are increasingly negative, lending support to the 
argument that a fall in popularity of auctions as a sale method later in the sample was 
due partly to relatively weak market conditions in 2001, a fall in the sales rate at 
auction, and growing adverse media attention concerning the high premiums over 
guide prices that auctions were achieving.   
 
With respect to the number of bidders, non-property papers such Saidi & Marsden 
(1992) and Chen et al. (2003), together with those to have directly considered real 
estate such Ching & Fu (2003), Ong et al. (2005), Ong (2006) and Ooi et al. (2006) 
have all provided evidence that the number of bidders significantly impacts, in a 
positive sense, upon either the price obtained or the probability of a sale being 
achieved
5
. Although in a different context, Gilbert & Klemperer (2000) illustrate that 
it may be more profitable for a seller to ration output, thus selling at a fixed price at a 
level at which demand exceeds supply, rather than selling at a higher price that clears 
the market. The underlying rationale here relates to the idea that the offering of lower 
price acts as an incentive for more buyers to enter the market. In the context of our 
paper this does have a direct relevance; furthermore, it can be tied to the arguments of 
Glower et al. (1998) who note that vendors convey information about their desire to 
sell the property through the listing price that is set. The role of bidders can in some 
respects also be tied to the issue of market conditions, as it is likely that auctions 
undertaken during stronger conditions will see a higher number of potential bidders. 
Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) explicitly argue that efficiency and therefore the 
revenue generated, will be higher when more bidders enter the auction
6
. Mayer (1995) 
argues that a rise in the number of bidders also increases the likelihood of the 
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participation of high-value bidders. In an auction context, this could be viewed as 
those with higher private values of the property concerned. The recent work of Chow 
et al. (2011) also notes this. They argue that auctions will be the preferred sale 
mechanism in a case where bidders with higher valuations participate
7
.  
 
The number of bidders is also related to the concept of bid-shading. Bid-shading is 
more commonly associated with common-value auctions with incomplete information 
where due to the risk of a winner’s curse bidders may bid below their valuation. 
However, bid-shading can also be considered in the context of English Auctions. In 
this context bid-shading may occur in an attempt to optimize their expected value. 
This is rationale as if an auction participant automatically bids at a level equal to their 
valuation then they gain nothing if they are successful in the auction. By reducing the 
bid they would increase their expected value, albeit at a reduce probability of being 
the successful bidder. It would however be expected that in the presence of an 
increased number of bidders the degree of bid-shading observed would be reduced, 
especially where private values play an important role, leading to a higher final sale 
price
8
.  
 
However, whilst market conditions can play a role in the success or otherwise of 
auctions, the differences observed across countries can be due to an additional factor, 
namely the type of properties sold through auction. In Ireland, as in countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand, houses sold through auction generally tend to be those at 
the premium end of the market. In an Irish context this is illustrated in Stevenson et al. 
(2010) with 43.66% of auctions being in the highest decile alone. Furthermore, 
Stevenson et al. (2010) note that a significant auction premium was only noted in 
properties selling in excess of €500,000. Papers such as Wilson (1977) and Milgrom 
(1986) provide a theoretical context for such results, arguing that auctions will be 
preferred in the case of high quality goods and those that are less standardized. Higher 
value properties would be a typical case of such a class of assets. Property value and 
sale mechanism choice can be related to the issue of scarcity. French & McCormick 
(1984) argue that a vendor will opt for a negotiated sale when they can either identity 
the highest potential bidder in advance or when they is reduced dispersion in the 
value, i.e. greater homogeneity. In contrast, where greater heterogeneity is observed 
then auctions may be preferred. In relatively cheaper property submarkets there will 
 10 
be increased market activity in terms of the number of possible properties on the 
market, therefore a greater availability of comparable sales information. This has two 
implications. Firstly, that there should be a higher level of certainty regarding the true 
value of the property. Secondly, the increased supply of close substitutes means that 
bidders have greater choice. In contrast, higher value and more heterogeneous 
properties effectively contain a higher degree of private value relating to the specific 
characteristics of the property. Effectively, a scarcity issue comes into play
9
. This 
could lead to more determined bidding and thus the greater efficiency of auctions. A 
further factor that may also play a role at the higher end of the market relates to 
financing constraints. It may be the case that bidders at the lower end of the market 
are subject to greater constraints in this regard and therefore an auction premium is 
not observed
10
. 
 
The influence of market conditions may also have an impact in another respect. This 
is concerned with the nature of the bids themselves and the information revealed 
during the auction process. This is important in the context of our analysis of 
withdrawn properties. Although the auction sale was not successful, information 
concerning bidding and value may be revealed during the auction process. Lusht 
(1996) notes the importance of the auction process when bids are not independent but 
rather affiliated. Lusht (1996) argues that the actual auction process reveals additional 
information that would be otherwise unobserved in the case of pure independent bids. 
It has the effect that a bidder’s private value is influenced by the information revealed 
at the auction in terms of the behaviour of other bidders. It may therefore lead to a 
bidder upwardly revising their valuation. The combination of this use of other 
bidder’s revealed valuations together with the price rule also ensures that there is a 
preference in terms of revenue over sealed bid auctions (Levin et al., 1996). Milgrom 
& Weber (1982) argue that English open outcry auctions will be revenue maximizing 
if bids are affiliated rather than independent in comparison to sealed bids as a high 
valuation assigned by one bidder makes higher valuations by other bidders more 
likely
11
.  
 
Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) note that the combination of common and private 
values can lead to inefficiencies. One of the examples that they note is when a party 
with a lower private value then another bidder may still end up purchasing the 
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asset/good where they have placed a higher valuation on the common valuation. 
Whether this higher assessment of the common value is realistic or not is irrelevant. 
They argue that auction efficiency will increase, and therefore the vendor’s revenue, 
with increased certainty concerning common values. The argument is based upon the 
premise that uncertainty regarding the common value can, in the limit, override 
bidder’s private information. At the opposite end of the spectrum, if there was no 
uncertainty regarding the common value, then the auction reduces to a pure private 
value auction
12
. In a broader context Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) highlight that 
in practice few auctions can be neatly categorized as displaying solely private or 
common values. In the context of residential property it is clearly the case that bidders 
will take into account both common information (e.g. potential price appreciation) 
and private information (e.g. location and architectural preferences). 
 
As noted above, most of the auction literature in this area has been concerned with 
different sale mechanisms and specifically that English open outcry auctions are 
optimal when bids are affiliated. However, in the context of our study there is an 
additional element. Even if a property is withdrawn from sale at auction the bids can 
still be affiliated. This is especially so if the final purchaser was present at the auction 
and therefore observed the behaviour of other bidders. As we discuss in the following 
section, the time on market from the auction to subsequent sale is very short in most 
cases. This would imply that the purchaser was present at the auction and possibly the 
highest unsuccessful bidder given the convention to give them the first right of 
negotiation. This also adds in the transmission of information from the auction to the 
subsequent private treaty negotiations.  
 
 
4: Data 
The data analysed consists of residential properties located in the Greater Dublin 
metropolitan area that were put forward for sale through at auction during the period 
1998 to 2002. The data was provided by one of the major auctioneer/estate agents in 
Dublin and consists of all information relating to the property and auction contained 
in their records
13
. It is important to highlight market conditions during the sample 
period. The 1998 through 2002 period was characterized by strong housing market 
conditions and rapid price appreciation. As noted previously, studies such as Mayer 
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(1995) have illustrated the importance of controlling for market conditions. However, 
in the context of the current study, whilst time dummies are included in the model 
specifications, there is less need to control for varying conditions. However, the 
results obtained do need to be considered solely in the context of strong market 
conditions and may not necessarily transfer to weaker markets. In addition, the 
broader comments of Mayer (1995) with respect to the optimality of auctions versus 
negotiated sales in booming markets needs to be taken into consideration
14
. 
 
In total data on 404 properties is available. The sample includes properties that were 
both successfully sold at auction and those properties that were withdrawn. The 
withdrawn sample effectively includes three types. The first is those properties 
initially marketed as being offered at auction but that were sold privately prior to the 
auction. The second sub-sample consists of those properties that were withdrawn at 
auction and subsequently sold through private treaty negotiations. The final set 
contains properties that did not successfully sell after being withdrawn at auction. It 
should be noted that none of the withdrawn properties were re-auctioned; rather all of 
them were subsequently offered for sale through private treaty. Out of the total sample 
of 404 properties, 198 were successfully sold at auction, 15 were sold prior to the 
auction, and the remaining 191 were withdrawn at auction. Among the 191 withdrawn 
properties, 77 of them subsequently sold by private treaty
15
.  
 
There is potential selectivity bias present in all studies of sale mechanisms in that the 
vendor’s decision as to the mechanism selected may be associated with missing price 
affecting variables. This may result in differences in prices being wrongly attributed 
to the sale mechanism adopted rather than the omitted variable. Given that we are 
solely considering properties at least initially advertised as being sold through auction 
we avoid this issue directly. Stevenson et al. (2010) do consider selectivity in the 
context of the Irish market and in their sample of privately sold and auctioned 
properties do not find evidence of selectivity bias. 
 
The variables concerning the auction consist of the guide price, the undisclosed 
reserve price where available and the sale price where appropriate. In cases where the 
property was withdrawn and re-advertised for private treaty sale, the revised guide 
price for the property is also noted where available. As the auction house continued to 
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act as the estate agent for the property any change was held on their records. 
Undisclosed reserve prices are available for 240 of the 404 properties in the sample.  
In the remaining cases, the reserve was not available due to the property being sold 
prior to auction, and therefore a reserve was not set, or because the information was 
not recorded in the auction book. Data is also available on the number of bids, number 
of bidders on a particular property, the attendance at the auction, and whether multiple 
auctions were held that day. This data was recorded on the day of the auction by the 
agency and then subsequently released to ourselves. Throughout the auction a 
member of staff would note all bids, identifying individual bidders. This then allows a 
separation of the number of bids from the number of bidders. Attendance is defined 
by a head count of people in the room. This is aided by the auctions taken place in the 
offices of the agency, not at the property as is sometimes the case, for example in 
markets such as Australia. The multiple auction dummy is based on the records from 
the firm and was simply based on whether more than one auction took place on one 
day. This is of interest as the firm would hold the auctions together, back to back, 
rather than at different times in the day
16
.  
 
In addition to the data directly related to the auction process, information is also 
available for a variety of property specific variables. These include the location of the 
property, the type of property, the date of sale, the availability of parking facilities, the 
number of bedrooms, and the number of bathrooms. Unfortunately reliable floor area 
data was not available, leading to the bedroom and bathroom data having to act as 
proxies for property size.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample, both in total (Panel A) and for the 
withdrawn sub-sample (Panel B). Panel C reports the split across both samples by 
location and property type. The dummy variables used with respect to location divide 
the properties into the following areas of Greater Dublin: Central City, South City, 
North City, South County and the Periphery of Dublin. Dublin postcodes have even 
numbers in the south of the city and odd numbers in the north which makes a clear 
demarcation of the sample straightforward. The Central City is defined by the 
postcodes D1, D2, D7 and D8. The South City includes all remaining even postcodes 
and the North City all remaining odd numbered postcodes. South County Dublin 
contains all areas within the County of Dublin south of the River Liffey, but not 
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formally within the City of Dublin. The remaining areas of the greater metropolitan 
area, including the remaining sections of County Dublin as well as parts of Kildare, 
Louth, Meath and Wicklow are grouped together. The location of properties in the 
sample is dominated by two key submarkets, namely South City and South County 
Dublin, which represent the most highly priced submarkets in Greater Dublin, thus 
confirming that auctions were used primarily at the premium end of the market during 
the period covered in this sample. Out of 404 properties in the overall sample, 161 
properties were located in the South City and a further 133 were located in South 
County Dublin. The sample is fairly evenly spread by property type, with the 
following categories used; detached (110), semi-detached house (96), bungalow (69), 
terrace/mews (104) and apartment (25). Compared to previous studies of the Irish 
auction market these are relatively consistent breakdowns
17
. Whilst small individual 
samples are observed for some locational or sector segments (e.g. apartments and the 
city centre) given the modelling framework adopted and the fact that they are not 
considered in isolation reduces the risk of bias in this respect. However, the overall 
sample size and the concentration of it in South Dublin and in detached and semi-
detached houses, needs to be considered when examining the empirical findings.  
 
When one considers solely those properties that did not sell and were withdrawn they 
are not any substantive differences in either the property type or location segments. 
With respect to the property types the only shift worth commenting upon is that there 
marginally fewer semi-detached properties were withdrawn and marginally more 
detached properties. However, the figures do not, even in these cases, shift 
substantially. With respect to the data reported in Panel’s A and B there are not 
noticeable differences across the two samples. One point that is worth noting is the 
short time on market for withdrawn properties post auction. The average time to 
subsequent sale is only 9.88 days, whilst the median is just one day. As noted 
previously in the paper, convention in the Irish market at this time held that the right 
of first negotiation was with the highest bidder. These figures would imply that in 
many cases the ultimate buyer was a participant at the auction, if not indeed the 
highest unsuccessful bidder. This does indeed add to the underlying rationale of the 
paper as it highlights the flow of information and how it was transmitted from the 
auction to the purchaser and its impact upon the subsequent sale price
18
.    
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5: Empirical Analysis 
The first section of the empirical analysis considers whether the final sale mechanism 
impacted upon the price achieved. The broad methodological framework adopted is 
similar to that adopted in many previous papers, such as Lusht (1996), Mayer (1998), 
Ong et al. (2005) and Stevenson et al. (2010). The model used is a standard log 
hedonic model as displayed in Equation (1). 
 
ii   X)price saleln(         (1) 
 
X represents the hedonic characteristics of the property. Dummy variables are 
included to indicate whether the property was successfully sold at auction or whether 
it was sold prior with the missing dummy referring to withdrawn properties.  
However, given that the dependent variable is the sale price, the withdrawn properties 
included in this specification are those that did subsequently sell. In addition to the 
sale mechanism dummies the model also includes property specific variables 
concerning the number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms and whether parking 
facilities were available. Finally, groups of dummies relating to property type, 
location and year of sale are also include. The base property was a bungalow, located 
in North City Dublin that sold in 2000
19
. 
 
The results in Table 2 report a positive coefficient for properties selling at auction; 
however, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The interpretation of 
this finding needs to be carefully considered, particularly in the context of the results 
in Stevenson et al. (2010) who found evidence of an auction premium. A key element 
that differentiates these two samples is that Stevenson et al. (2010) examined a sample 
containing both auction and private treaty sales. In contrast, the current sample is 
limited to only those properties that were at least initially put up for sale by auction. 
Therefore, when considering the sold at auction dummy it important to understand 
that this is relative to the sale price achieved by properties withdrawn and 
subsequently sold after going through the auction process. This is an issue that we 
will return to, in that it may be that although the withdrawn properties did not sell at 
auction, their final realised price was influenced by the auction process, hence the 
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lack of a significant coefficient in this regard. This is consistent with the arguments 
presented in Lusht (1996) in terms of bidder’s valuations being influenced by the 
information revealed by other bidders in an auction setting. The remaining 
coefficients are generally in line with expectations with significant positive 
coefficients reported with respect to the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, 
apartments, detached properties and those located in South City and South County 
Dublin. In terms of the year dummies, they reflect the strong upward movement in the 
market during the sample period with a significant negative coefficient for 1998 and 
positive findings for 2001 and 2002.  
 
Table 2 also reports the findings when the log of the guide price is substituted in the 
place of the realized sale price. The results for the majority of the variables are as 
reported when sale prices were considered. It is however with respect to the auction 
dummy that an interesting finding is observed. The properties that were successfully 
sold at auction appear to have been advertised at a significantly lower guide than 
those that did not sell and were withdrawn. Again, the comparison with Stevenson et 
al. (2010) is not as simple as one may initial think as our sample is constrained to 
solely those properties that were advertised as being sold through auction. In this case 
it may be that the guide price plays a more subtle role. The result can be interpreted 
that properties whose relative guide price is lower are more likely to sell. Therefore, 
in that sense the results support the view of Stevenson et al. (2010) in that the guide is 
being used as a marketing tool in order to encourage participation in the auction and 
hence increase the likelihood of a successful sale.  
 
The main empirical results are however directly concerned with the influence of the 
auction process on the prices achieved subsequently for properties that were 
withdrawn. Few papers have considered this, the two primary exceptions in a housing 
context being Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) and Ong (2006). Our withdrawn 
sample includes a total of 191 properties. Of these 77 were subsequently sold, 114 
remaining unsold. As with the overall sample, property specific characteristic data is 
available, as are the details from the auction itself. The analysis is based upon a probit 
model that considers the probability of sale. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable taking the value of unity if the property was sold post auction and zero 
otherwise. The independent variables include property specific variables, namely; the 
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number of bathrooms, bedrooms and a dummy indicating whether the property had 
parking facilities. Groups of dummies were included to capture the impact of property 
type, location and the year of sale. The base property was a bungalow, located in 
North City Dublin, sold in 2000. The auction variables included relate to the 
attendance at the auction, the number of bidders, the number of bids and whether 
multiple auctions were held that day. We also include a variable which takes the value 
of unity if no bids were made at auction and zero otherwise
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.  
 
The findings from the Binary Probit model are included in Table 3 and take three 
alternative specifications.  In addition to the core property and auction variables these 
include, in turn, the New Guide-to-Old Guide premium, the New Guide-to-Reserve 
premium and the Reserve Price. None of the variables relating to attendance at 
auction and the number of bids/bidders are significant in this case.  While this is in 
sharp contrast Ong (2006), that sample of Singaporean properties primarily consisted 
of apartments and contained a large number of distressed sales. The resulting more 
homogeneous sample may explain the difference in the findings reported.  However, 
the No Bids dummy is significant in two of the models, and has the anticipated 
negative sign.  Therefore, if no bids were achieved at auction it reduced the likelihood 
of a subsequent negotiated sale. The other coefficients that report significant results 
from the probit are those relating to the year dummies. The dummy for 1998 is 
significant in each specification, as are those for 1999 and 2001 in Model I. This is 
very likely due to the strong market conditions during this period.  
 
The results also show that the Reserve Price has a significant negative impact in the 
third specification. This may be reflecting an over-valuation of the property that, 
despite the failure to sell at auction, continues into the subsequent private 
negotiations. However, this result needs to be viewed also in the context of the 
significant positive coefficient relating to the New Guide-to-Old Guide premium in 
the second model.  This would imply that if the guide price was revised upwards 
following the auction, it significantly increased the probability of a subsequent sale. 
While this may appear counter intuitive, two issues arising from this finding.  The 
first issue is that any upward movement in the guide following the auction may reflect 
an indication of demand for the property amongst potential buyers, even if this 
demand did not result in a successful sale. Secondly, it needs to be remembered that 
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the initial guide price was originally set with an eye towards an auction sale with the 
aim of encouraging participation in the auction. Therefore, an increase in the guide 
price after withdrawal at auction may be a reflection of a more realistic assessment of 
the value of the property. This can be illustrated by looking at the average figures 
from the raw data where the withdrawn sample had an average initial guide price of 
€487,584 whilst the average revised, post auction, guide price increases to €509,410. 
Out of 190 observations, 86 properties see an upwards adjustment, only 4 see a 
reduction, and the remainder see no change. If you constrain the sample to only those 
properties where the reserve prices are available, the situation becomes clearer. With 
88 properties in the sample where reserve prices are available and the properties were 
subsequently withdrawn, the average initial guide is €423,864, rising to €453,205 post 
auction.  Again in the majority of cases the guide was adjusted upwards (52 cases) 
with only one example of a downward adjustment. However, the average reserve 
price of the 88 properties was €478,807. Therefore, while a property may have seen 
its guide increased, it was still on average less than the reserve. Indeed, the average 
percentage difference between the revised guide and the reserve is -4.31%. Hence, 
whilst the guide has been adjusted upwards this is perhaps reflective of an admission 
that the initial guide was not a true indication of the underlying value. The fact that on 
average the revised guide is less than the reserve shows the impact of a failure to sell 
and the use of a perhaps more realistic assessment for subsequent negotiations.  
 
Table 4 presents the final set of empirical findings which relate the analysis of the sale 
premiums achieved in the case of the withdrawn properties. The dependent variable is 
the percentage premium of the achieved sale price relative to the opening bid, guide 
price and reserve respectively
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. The primary issue of note in these results relates to 
the renewed importance of the auction process with respect to participation. The 
Number of Bidders is significant in two of the three specifications, whilst the Number 
of Bids is significant in one model each. Overall Auction Attendance however fails to 
achieve significance in any of the models. These findings highlight the importance of 
the auction process, in terms of encouraging interest and participation and are in line 
with the findings of Ong (2006). However, the findings do have to be considered with 
a degree of caution. It is important to remember that the opening bid and the guide 
price contain information that does not necessarily reflect an estimate of market value. 
Therefore, any discounting of these figures and therefore a higher premium does have 
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to be viewed in that light. The result with respect to the Reserve Price is however 
more robust as it should more accurately reflect the agents and vendors assessment of 
market value. Therefore, any significant findings here can be viewed, at least with a 
greater degree of certainty, that the Number of Bids is significant in the price achieved 
post auction.  
 
 
6: Conclusion 
Existing empirical work that has considered auctions in a property context has largely 
concentrated on the issue of the choice of sale mechanism and whether properties sold 
at auction achieve a different price than those transacted privately. In contrast, few 
studies have considered the issue of whether the auction process impacts upon the sale 
price achieved by those properties that were initially withdrawn from sale at auction 
and subsequently sold through negotiation. In considering variables that are often 
missing from much of the empirical work on auctions, it was found that the reserve 
price, initial guide prices, and after auction guide prices provide additional price 
information to auction participants. The resultant impact on subsequent sale after 
withdrawal of a property from auction and for price premiums after withdrawal is 
associated with key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself.   
 
In part the empirical results reported may be due to, or enhanced, due to the practices 
present in the Irish market during this period. The convention that vendors negotiated 
initially with the highest unsuccessful bidder may explain a number of issues arising 
from our results. Firstly, it helps to explain the very short time to sale post auction 
figures reported. Secondly, even if the eventual purchaser was not the highest bidder 
but just present at the auction, it would aid in the flow of information. This helps to 
underline our core hypothesis that information revealed at the auction significantly 
impacts upon the final sale price achieved. This includes the transmission of indirect 
information concerning private values through variables such as attendance and the 
number of bids and bidders.   
 
Whilst the results do illustrate the importance of the auction process in the 
determination of sale prices, even in the case of unsuccessful auctions, the needs to be 
a degree of caution voiced with respect to some issues. The results are specific not 
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only to be an individual market but also one that was observing a period of sustained 
house price appreciation during this period. Whilst the auction market witnessed a 
virtual collapse following the reversal in market conditions in 2007, it would ideally 
have been nice to have data covering a broader range of market conditions. As 
frequently observed in the housing auction literature open outcry English auctions can 
have different dynamics at different stages of the market cycle. In addition, this is 
added to given the concentration of our sample in relatively heterogeneous high value 
properties. At the same time, it should be noted that the results are consistent with 
those reported in Ong (2006) who considered a far more homogenous sample, namely 
Singaporean apartments.  
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Number 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Sale Price 452,033.91 358,000 117,100 2,750,000 289  
Guide Price 418,542.08 327,500 85,000 3,200,000 404  
Reserve Price 424,125.00 340,000 100,000 2,200,000 240  
Withdrawn Price 498,388.24 350,000 110,0000 3,200,000 85  
Number in Attendance 20.37 14 0 70 404  
Number of Bids 12.32 8 0 88 404 
Number of Bidders 2.25 2 0 10 404 
Number of Auctions on Day 2.34 2 1 7 404 
Bathrooms 1.73 1.5 1 5 404 
Bedrooms 3.81 4 1 8 404 
Panel B: Withdrawn Sample 
Sale Price 428,828.21 327,000 134,000 1,750,000 77 
Guide Price 485,816.75 390,000 120,000 3,200,000 191 
Reserve Price 475,674.16 390,000 130,000 1,300,000 89 
Withdrawn Price 498,388.24 350,000 110,0000 3,200,000 85 
Number in Attendance 13.60 9 0 60 191 
Number of Bids 2.13 0 0 41 191 
Number of Bidders 0.79 0 0 5 191 
Number of Auctions on Day 2.37 2 1 7 191 
Time After Auction to Subsequent Sale 9.88 1 0 56 77 
Bathrooms 1.86 2 1 5 191 
Bedrooms 3.88 4 2 7 191 
Panel C: Counts for Dummy Variables 
 Overall Sample Withdrawn Sample  
Apartment 25 (6.19%) 13 (6.81%)  
Bungalow 69 (17.08%) 33 (17.28%)  
Detached 110 (27.23%) 60 (31.41%)  
Semi-Detached 96 (23.76%) 36 (18.85%)  
Terrace/Mews 104 (25.74%) 49 (25.65%)  
Central  City 27 (6.68%) 11 (5.76%)  
North City 45 (11.14%) 18 (9.42%)  
South City 161 (39.85%) 72 (37.70%)  
South County Dublin 133 (32.92%) 68 (35.60%)  
Periphery 38 (9.41%) 22 (11.52%)  
Notes: Table 1 reports summary statistics for some of the key variables. The summary statistics are 
reported on the basis of both the overall sample and the properties that were withdrawn.  
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Table 2: Sale Mechanism Tests 
 Guide Prices Sale Prices 
Constant 
11.7187 
(77.1991***) 
11.8826 
(70.1556***) 
Sold at Auction Dummy 
-0.1097 
(-2.2938**) 
0.0608 
(1.1706) 
Sold Prior Dummy 
0.0019 
(0.0178) 
0.0515 
(0.4772) 
Bathrooms 
0.2556 
(3.2663***) 
0.2279 
(2.8386***) 
Bedrooms 
0.6124 
(6.3483***) 
0.5577 
(5.0659***) 
Parking 
0.0739 
(1.2805) 
0.0593 
(0.9190) 
Apartment 
0.1420 
(1.6696*) 
0.1633 
(1.6477) 
Terrace/Mews 
0.0006 
(0.0080) 
-0.0407 
(-0.5081) 
Semi-Detached 
-0.0096 
(-0.1497) 
-0.0293 
(-0.4341) 
Detached 
0.3232 
(4.1586***) 
0.2850 
(3.3569***) 
Central Dublin 
0.0898 
(0.8642) 
0.0632 
(0.5986) 
South City 
0.2019 
(2.6927***) 
0.2206 
(2.9281***) 
South County Dublin 
0.1860 
(2.3586**) 
0.1998 
(2.5349**) 
Periphery 
0.0824 
(0.9039) 
0.0471 
(0.4571) 
1998 
-0.3312 
(-4.93000***) 
-0.3108 
(-4.0686***) 
1999 
-0.1786 
(-2.5326**) 
-0.1137 
(-1.4575) 
2001 
0.3637 
(3.6637***) 
0.3623 
(3.2602***) 
2002 
0.4184 
(4.0636***) 
0.4854 
(4.2242***) 
R
2
 adjusted 0.5780 0.5116 
Observations 289 289 
Notes: Table 2 reports the coefficients estimated from a log hedonic model using Sale and Guide Prices 
as the dependent variables. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 3: Probit Models Examining the Probability of Sale of Withdrawn Properties 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic 
Constant -0.5082 0.7513 -0.6764 1.1998 1.2909 0.9294 3.8125 1.8028 2.1148** 
Bathrooms -0.2130 0.1702 -1.2519 -0.1900 0.2820 -0.6736 -0.0438 0.0871 -0.5036 
Bedrooms -0.0593 0.1404 -0.4222 -0.3204 0.2544 -1.2595 -0.0015 0.0864 -0.0169 
Parking -0.0665 0.2527 -0.2632 -0.9375 0.4559 -2.0565** -0.2393 0.1353 -1.7688* 
Apartment 0.0790 0.561 0.1408 0.1118 1.3551 0.0825 0.1133 0.2995 0.3782 
Terrace/Mews -0.2066 0.3866 -0.5345 -0.3412 0.6539 -0.5219 0.0115 0.1802 0.0640 
Semi-Detached -0.2597 0.4000 -0.6493 0.0108 0.6264 0.0172 0.0552 0.1845 0.2989 
Detached -0.1464 0.3509 -0.4173 -0.1424 0.6478 -0.2200 0.1201 0.1871 0.6421 
Central Dublin 0.9068 0.5852 1.5495 1.0040 1.1274 0.8905 0.0507 0.3102 0.1633 
South City 0.5240 0.3978 1.3173 0.2235 0.6283 0.3558 0.0273 0.1818 0.1501 
South County Dublin 0.4158 0.3952 1.0523 -0.0933 0.6679 -0.1397 -0.0526 0.1921 -0.2739 
Periphery 0.3193 0.5103 0.6258 0.0235 0.9363 0.0251 0.0568 0.2703 0.2101 
1998 1.5586 0.3499 4.4539*** 2.2090 0.7500 2.9454*** 0.4580 0.1815 2.5230** 
1999 0.9531 0.3495 2.7267*** 0.9884 0.7231 1.3700 0.2410 0.1740 1.3856 
2001 0.7615 0.4061 1.8753* 0.9020 1.0132 0.8903 0.2032 0.2475 0.8212 
2002 -0.7513 0.7838 -0.9585 0.0549 1.9018 0.0289 0.1169 0.3604 0.3243 
Auction Attendance 0.0025 0.0083 0.3051 0.0044 0.0160 0.2724 -0.0012 0.0041 -0.3037 
Number of Bidders 0.1654 0.2847 0.5811 0.4309 0.3908 1.1026 0.0274 0.1087 0.2524 
Number of Bids 0.0049 0.0460 0.1060 -0.0282 0.0633 -0.4458 0.0018 0.0172 0.1022 
Multiple Auctions -0.4421 0.3052 -1.4486 -0.8268 0.5760 -1.4354 -0.1214 0.1681 -0.7224 
No Bids -0.6345 0.3849 -1.6485* -1.0280 0.5870 -1.7513* -0.2506 0.1625 -1.5422 
Order of Auction 0.2202 0.2825 0.7795 0.4990 0.4607 1.0832 -0.0035 0.1288 -0.0272 
New Guide-Guide (%) 1.3031 1.2018 1.0843 - - - - - - 
New Guide-Reserve (%) - - - 6.3389 3.1271 2.0271** - - - 
Reserve Price - - - - - - -0.2573 0.1523 -1.6895* 
McFadden R2  0.2500   0.3664   0.3938   
Observations 190   88   89   
Notes: Three alternative specifications of a Binary Probit model are estimated on those properties that were withdrawn at auction. The dependent variable in a binary variable which takes the 
value of unity if the property sold following the auction and zero if it remained unsold. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 4: Sale Premiums on Withdrawn Properties 
 Sale-Open Bid (%) Sale-Guide (%) Sale-Reserve (%) 
Constant 
0.2157 
(0.2146) 
-0.0855 
(0.1150) 
-0.0221 
(0.0577) 
Auction Attendance 
0.0002 
(0.0025) 
0.0022 
(0.0021) 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
Number of Bidders 
0.0881 
(0.0375)** 
0.0726 
(0.0380)* 
-0.0138 
(0.0140) 
Number of Bids 
-0.0018 
(0.0048) 
-0.0012 
(0.0051) 
0.0047 
(0.0022)** 
Multiple Auctions 
0.0055 
(0.0550) 
-0.0741 
(0.0291)** 
-0.0120 
(0.0268) 
No Bids - 
0.1103 
(0.0431)** 
0.0001 
(0.0188) 
Previous Auction Sold 
0.0425 
(0.0839) 
-0.0248 
(0.0599) 
-0.0264 
(0.0312) 
Order of Auction 
-0.0654 
(0.0782) 
0.0663 
(0.0454) 
0.0138 
(0.0263) 
R
2
 adjusted 0.0879 0.2119 0.3855 
Observations 48 77 45 
Notes: Three alternative OLS models are estimated with the percentage change of the sale price over 
the opening bid, guide and reserve price. The sample is constrained to just consider those properties 
that were withdrawn at auction. The full results including the property specific variables are available 
from the authors. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 Ireland has a very high owner-occupancy rate, even in 2011 following the recent crash it 
stood at approximately 70%. This means that valuations are determined by the comparable 
sales method and do not relate to the rental market. 
2
 The current market conditions in Ireland are obviously different from those prevailing 
during the sample. More recently auctions have been used more frequently in the context of 
distressed/foreclosed sales with also a larger number of properties offered at one auction. 
3
 One of the anonymous referees notes that due to these high barriers to entry and an 
increased opportunity cost there may be a selection bias from the perspective of the bidders. 
This may arise in that potential bidders with higher opportunity costs may be attracted 
towards the premium end of the market. This is hard to explicitly consider without the 
availability of a comparably detailed private treaty sample. It should be emphasised though 
that as Stevenson et al. (2010) illustrate, during this period the majority of highly valued 
properties sold through auction. Furthermore, in addition to the requirement of an immediate 
non-refundable deposit, extremely high stamp duty rates at the premium end of the market 
were liable during this period (see Berry et al., 2001).  
4
 See also papers such as Harris & Raviv (1981), McAfee & McMillan (1988) and Campbell 
& Levin (2006).  
5
 The role of the number of bidders in obtaining higher prices at auction is shown in 
theoretical papers such as Vickery (1961), Holt (1979), Harris & Raviv (1981) and McAfee & 
McMillan (1987).  
6
 Pesendorfer & Swinkels (2000) note that a large number of bidders can lead to a resumption 
of efficiency, even in the case of a two-signal auction. 
7
 On a more general note Chow et al. (2010) also support the previously cited work relating to 
the importance of market conditions and that auctions are more likely to outperform during 
periods of strong house price appreciation. 
8
 The authors would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for highlighting the issue of 
bid-shading. For broader discussions concerning bid-shading see papers such as Jeitschko 
(1999), Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003), Milgorm & Weber (2000), Nautz & Wolfstetter 
(1997), Vulcano et al. (2002) and Zeithammer (2007).  
9
 The arguments laid out by Quan (2002) can also be assessed in this context. Quan (2002) 
illustrates that bidders with higher search costs will tend to participate in auctions. Properties 
at the premium end of the market would fit this description. Quan (2002) also provides 
evidence that the price obtained should be enhanced in an auction context.  
10
 In markets such as the United States and also Singapore where a large proportion of 
auctions involve distressed sales the situation may be quite different. As Ong et al. (2005) 
note the sellers of distressed properties may be more willing to sell quickly and at a 
discounted price in order to recoup some of their investment. In contrast willing sellers will 
be less willing to either sell quickly or at a discount. If an auction market, such as Ireland, is 
dominated by willing sellers then this does make a distinct difference based on the nature of 
the sellers concerned and a possible reduced likelihood of an auction discount being observed, 
particularly during strong housing market conditions.  
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11
 It should be noted that the Milgrom & Weber (1982) model that shows the preference over 
sealed bids is illustrated in the case of ‘irrevocable exit’, whereby bidders who withdraw from 
the auction cannot subsequently re-enter. Sealed bid auctions will maximize revenue in the 
case of independent bids and risk-averse bidders. 
12
 Under an assumption of independent private values this therefore reverts to the Vickery 
(1961) structure whereby the good is purchased by the bidder who has the highest private 
value.  
13
 Part of the conditions agreed to when obtaining the data was that the auction house remains 
anonymous. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the data meant that no data after 2002 was 
released. 
14
 See studies such as Berry et al. (2001), D’Agostino et al. (2008, McQuinn (2004), Roche 
(2001) and Stevenson (2008) for more general discussions concerning the dynamics of the 
Irish housing market during this period.  
15
 The proportion of the sample that is withdrawn at auction is quite high at 47%; it is also 
higher than that reported by Stevenson et al. (2010) in their analysis of the Irish auction 
market. This may simply be due to the auction house concerned adopting a more rigorous 
policy in this regard. As noted previously in the paper the convention in Ireland is that the 
highest bidder in the auction, even though unsuccessful has the right of first negotiation. The 
fact that the majority of the properties withdrawn sold very quickly would imply that in many 
cases the property was sold to someone present at the auction. It is therefore possible that the 
auction house withdrew properties with this knowledge feeling that subsequent private 
negotiations may result in a more favourable outcome.  
16
 It should be noted that the number of bids and bidders is specific to the individual auction 
and is not aggregated across all auctions held that day. This likewise is the case in the 
scenario of no bids.  
17
 See Stevenson et al. (2010).  
18
 We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for their observations on this point. 
19
 An earlier version of this paper took the more conventional route and excluded the 1998 
dummy from the models. However, given the strong upward movement in the market this 
resulted in all of the included time dummies being positive and significant. This did lead to 
some confusion when the earlier version of the paper was presented. The choice of excluded 
dummy is arbitrary and does not impact on the coefficients for other variables, therefore to 
avoid potential mis-understandings we re-ran the analysis with 2000 excluded. The original 
results are available from the authors on request. 
20
 We did also consider the use of a measure of time-on-market post auction. However, as 
already noted, the fact that most properties sold very quickly following their withdrawal 
meant that meaningful results were not obtained when such a measure was included in the 
analysis. 
21
 For the sake of brevity Table 4 only reports the coefficients for those variables directly 
related to the auction process. However, the models did include all of the property specific 
control variables incorporated into the previous models. The full results are available from the 
authors on request. As would be expected given the nature of the tests, the control variables 
were largely insignificant. Indeed, only one variable was found to be significant at 
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conventional. This case was for the Central City location dummy in the Sale-Reserve 
specification when it was noted as being significantly negative.  
